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Abstract. This paper addresses the problem of multi-agent inverse rein-
forcement learning (MIRL) in a two-player general-sum stochastic game
framework. Five variants of MIRL are considered: uCS-MIRL, advE-
MIRL, cooE-MIRL, uCE-MIRL, and uNE-MIRL, each distinguished by
its solution concept. Problem uCS-MIRL is a cooperative game in which
the agents employ cooperative strategies that aim to maximize the to-
tal game value. In problem uCE-MIRL, agents are assumed to follow
strategies that constitute a correlated equilibrium while maximizing to-
tal game value. Problem uNE-MIRL is similar to uCE-MIRL in total
game value maximization, but it is assumed that the agents are playing a
Nash equilibrium. Problems advE-MIRL and cooE-MIRL assume agents
are playing an adversarial equilibrium and a coordination equilibrium,
respectively. We propose novel approaches to address these five problems
under the assumption that the game observer either knows or is able to
accurate estimate the policies and solution concepts for players. For uCS-
MIRL, we first develop a characteristic set of solutions ensuring that the
observed bi-policy is a uCS and then apply a Bayesian inverse learning
method. For uCE-MIRL, we develop a linear programming problem sub-
ject to constraints that define necessary and sufficient conditions for the
observed policies to be correlated equilibria. The objective is to choose a
solution that not only minimizes the total game value difference between
the observed bi-policy and a local uCS, but also maximizes the scale
of the solution. We apply a similar treatment to the problem of uNE-
MIRL. The remaining two problems can be solved efficiently by taking
advantage of solution uniqueness and setting up a convex optimization
problem. Results are validated on various benchmark grid-world games.
Keywords: inverse reinforcement learning, multi-agent, game theory,
general-sum, correlated equilibrium, Nash equilibrium, cooperative games,
non-cooperative games
1 Introduction
In the problem of inverse reinforcement learning (IRL), the objective is to es-
timate the reward function for a Markov decision process (MDP) given obser-
vations of the policy followed by an agent assumed to be acting optimally [24].
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IRL has been applied to a number of problems, most related to the problems of
learning from demonstrations and apprenticeship learning [1,35,5]. Multi-agent
reinforcement learning (MRL) can be approached from an inverse perspective in
a manner analogous to that of IRL. A number of algorithms have been devel-
oped with theoretically or empirically guarantee to certain equilibriums, such as
Nash or correlated equilibriums [18,15,19,12,8,32,3,7]. Inverse learning problems
for MRL, which we term multi-agent inverse reinforcement learning (MIRL),
include the problem of estimating the payoffs of games, given only observations
of the actions taken by the players. Compared to the IRL problem, MIRL is
more challenging in that it is formalized in the context of a stochastic/Markov
game (see, e.g., [30,25]) rather than a MDP. Games bring two primary chal-
lenges: First, the concept of optimality, central to MDPs, loses its meaning and
must be replaced with a more general solution concept, such as the Nash equi-
librium (NE). Second, the non-uniqueness of equilibria means that in MIRL, in
addition to multiple reasonable solutions for a given inversion model, there may
be multiple inversion models that are all equally sensible approaches to solving
the problem.
IRL is a special or approximate version of MIRL in the sense that the former
treats other agents in the system as part of the environment, ignoring the dif-
ference between responsive agents and passive environment. A financial trading
example can be used to illustrate the difference. Yang et. al. [34] use the reward
functions inferred from IRL as a feature space for the purpose of classifying high-
frequency trading algorithms in the stock market. This treatment is reasonable
in a typical stock trading market. Usually there are many traders involved and
their activities give rise to cancellation effects that make it reasonable for any
one trader to model the collective actions of all the other traders as a stochastic
system. However, if the market is dominated by a small number of traders–such
as is the case currently with crypto-currency trading–the market should not
be modeled as a passive system. Rather, each dominant trader should take the
other’s possible strategies into account before making decisions. In such a case,
a stochastic game framework (used in MIRL) would be more appropriate than
a MDP framework (used in IRL).
Recently MIRL has attracted some interest from the machine learning re-
search community. Natarajan et al. address MIRL using an IRL model for mul-
tiple agents without dealing with interactions or interference among agents [23].
Waugh et al. [33] contribute to the inverse equilibrium problem, but in the
context of simultaneous one-stage games, rather than the sequential stochastic
games that are the subject of MIRL. Reddy et al. [29] use the concept of subgame
perfect equilibrium (SPE) [20], a refinement of NE used in dynamic games, to
address MIRL for general-sum stochastic games that have the property that each
player’s rewards do not depend on the actions of the others. Hadfield-Menell et
al. [13] introduce a cooperative IRL problem, motivated from an autonomous
system design problem, where the robot is required to align its value with those
of the humans in its environment in such a way that its actions contribute to
the maximization of values for the humans. Their problem is not modeled as a
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MIRL problem in a stochastic game context. Lin, Beling, and Cogill [17] develop
a Bayesian method but address only two-person zero-sum stochastic games. The
approach in [17] is not applicable to the general-sum case because the uniqueness
property of the minimax equilibrium in zero-sum games does not carry over to
key solution concepts, such as NE, in general-sum games. The non-uniqueness
of equilibria, in turn, makes it unclear how to specify the likelihood function for
a Bayesian inverse learning algorithm.
In this paper, we consider five special classes of two-person general-sumMIRL
problems, uCS-MIRL, advE-MIRL, cooE-MIRL, uCE-MIRL, and uNE-MIRL,
each distinguished by its solution concept. The first problem, uCS-MIRL, is a
cooperative game in which the agents employ cooperative strategies (CSs) that
aim to maximize the sum of their value functions, or the total game value. The
second and third problems consider circumstances in which two very special
and unique NEs are employed: advE is in general a win-or-lose equilibrium, but
not necessarily for a zero-sum game; cooE is such an equilibrium that players
maximize their own payoffs by coordinating with others. In the fourth problem,
uCE-MIRL, the agents are assumed to follow strategies that constitute a util-
itarian correlated equilibrium (uCE), which achieves the maximum total game
value among all CEs. In the last problem, uNE-MIRL, players are assumed to
follow strategies that constitute a NE that maximizes total game value.
First, advE and cooE come from [19] and uCE comes from [12]. uCS, I do not
want to say it is an ”equilibrium”, I would rather call it a ”strategy”, because
Cooperative Strategy (CS) is for a cooperative game not for a non-cooperative
game. Majority of MRL research has been focusing on non-cooperative games.
As for uNE, nobody has ever touched it in a forward perspective in any MRL
algorithm. Then why did we do it? Because as long as we can do uCE, we can
do uNE in a straightforward way without much efforts in theory.
The MIRL problems that we study from an inverse perspective arise in a
variety of application contexts. For example, uCS-MIRL, uCE-MIRL, and uNE-
MIRL embed solution concepts that correspond to agents trying to achieve a
socially efficient outcome (with or without certain constraints) that maximizes
the sum of their value functions and is a Pareto optimum, meaning that it is
not possible to make one player better off without also making the other player
worse off [6]. These equilibria are of particular interest in welfare economics,
in which policy makers try to design rules of games to achieve Pareto optimal
solutions in social welfare. Also, uCE has been studied from an MRL perspective
[12]. Despite the fact the advE and cooE-MIRL equilibria are not guaranteed
to exist, they have been studied in MRL [19] and have potential applications.
Consider an example in which two power suppliers compete with each other in
the local market. Though it can be viewed as a competitive game, the situation
is unlikely that evolve to a dominate-or-exit solution typical of zero-sum games.
Hence it might be more reasonable to assume the suppliers are playing an advE
equilibrium rather than a minimax solution to a zero-sum game. As for cooE,
the classic Stag Hunt game (see, e.g.) [31] is representative of a broad range of
social cooperation games. In Stag Hunt there are two hunters, each can chose
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to hunt hare or stag, with symmetric payoffs. If they both hunt stag(hare), they
both will get a payoff of 2(1); and if their targets are different, the one who hunts
stag will fail to get anything and the other will get a payoff of 1. In this game,
(stag, stag) is a cooE.
We propose novel approaches to address these five problems under the as-
sumption that the game observer knows or is able to accurately estimate the
policies and solution concepts for the players. For uCS/advE/cooE-MIRL, we
first develop a characteristic set of solutions ensuring that the observed bi-policy
is a corresponding strategy/equilibrium and then apply a Bayesian inverse learn-
ing method. For uCE-MIRL, we develop a linear programming problem, subject
to constraints that define necessary and sufficient conditions for the observed
policies to be a correlated equilibrium (CE). For the objective function, we pro-
pose novel heuristics to choose a solution that not only minimizes the total game
value difference between the observed bi-policy and its local uCS, but also max-
imizes the scale of the solution. We apply a similar treatment to the problem of
uNE-MIRL.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces
notation, terminology and definitions that will be used throughout this paper,
as well as some basic game theory equilibrium concepts through some examples.
Section 3 summarizes several conventional MIRL algorithms. Section 4 provides
the main technical work, developing different approaches for different problems
to learn rewards. Section 5 and Section 6 demonstrate our algorithms through
several benchmark experiments that include comparison with existing MIRL
algorithms. Section 7 offers concluding remarks and a discussion of future work.
2 Preliminaries
This section serves to introduce concepts and notation for MRL that will be
used throughout the paper. It also introduces relevant concepts and formalism
for two-player general-sum games and the equilibria of interest in later sections.
2.1 Stochastic Game
A two-player general-sum discounted stochastic game is a tuple {S,Ai, Ri, P, γ},
where S is the common state space for all players,Ai and Ri are the action space
and reward for player i, respectively. P is the probabilistic function controlling
state transitions, conditioned on the past state and joint actions. The reward
discount factor is γ ∈ [0, 1). In this paper, we assume that both players share
the same action space. The state and action spaces are both finite, i.e. |S| =
N and |Ai| = M . A stochastic game is a sequence of single-stage games, or
subgames, induced in every state s ∈ S, such that both players need to determine
an individual strategy pii (s) or negotiate a bi-strategy pi (s) that guides their
actions in every subgame. The collection of all bi-strategies is a bi-policy pi.
Note that an individual strategy can be a mixed strategy, which is a probability
distribution over all available actions. We define a pure bi-strategy a ∈ A = A1×
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A2 as a bi-strategy where both players select deterministic actions. Each player’s
reward values are assumed dependent on state and possibly, bi-strategies, but
are independent of each other.
2.2 MRL
Let r˜pii (s) be the expected reward value received by agent i at state s under
bi-policy pi, specifically,
r˜pii (s) =
∑
a
pi1 (a1|s)pi2 (a2|s)Ri (s, a)
= [pi1 (s)]
T Ri (s)pi2 (s) , ∀s ∈ S,
(1)
where a is a pure bi-strategy, pii (s) is a M × 1 vector denoting the probability
distribution over actions in state s. Ri (s) is aM×M matrix, each entry of which
denotes a pure bi-strategy dependent reward value. Structuring all Ri (s, a) into
a column vector as ri, we can simplify and represent (1) in a matrix notation as
r˜pii = Bpiri. (2)
The linear transformation operator Bpi is a N ×NM2 matrix constructed from
pi, whose kth row is: [
Φpi1,1 (k) , Φ
pi
1,2 (k) , · · · , Φ
pi
M,M (k)
]
,
where
Φpii,j (k) =

0, · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
k−1
, φpii,j (k) , 0, · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
N−k

 ,
and
φpii,j (k) = pi
1 (i|k)pi2 (j|k) .
Player i’s value function, starting at state s and under pi, is defined as
V pii (s) =
∞∑
t=0
γtE (r˜pii (st) |s0 = s) , (3)
and its Q -function, upon s and a, is
Qpii (s, a) = ri (s, a) + γ
∑
s′
p (s′|s, a)V pii (s
′)
= ri (s, a) + γPs,aV
pi
i .
(4)
A major difference between RL/IRL and MRL/MIRL, is the definition of the
value function. In MRL/MIRL,
V pii (s) ∈ solution concepti (Q
pi
1 (s) , Q
pi
2 (s)) , ∀s ∈ S (5)
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Players, of course, are free to choose any solution concept. In order to pose an
inverse learning problem, though, a particular choice of solution concept has to
be known or assumed.
Let Gpi denote a transition matrix under bi-policy pi. Specifically, Gpi is the
N ×N matrix with elements
gpi (s
′|s) =
∑
a
pi1 (a1|s)pi2 (a2|s) p (s
′|s, a) . (6)
Then
V pii (s) = r˜
pi
i (s) + γ
∑
s′
gpi (s
′|s)V pii (s
′) . (7)
In addition, V pii (s) can also be expressed in terms of the Q-function as
V pii (s) = [pi1 (s)]
T
Qpii (s)pi2 (s) , (8)
where Qpii (s) is a M ×M matrix. We can rewrite (7) in matrix notation as
V pii = r˜
pi
i + γGpiV
pi
i . (9)
Thus
V pii = (I − γGpi)
−1
Bpiri, (10)
where (I − γGpi) is always invertible for γ ∈ [0, 1) since Gpi is a transition ma-
trix. Restructuring Qpii (s, a) into a column vector, denoting Q
pi
i , we can rewrite
equation (4) in matrix notation, over all states and joint actions, as
Qpii = ri + γPV
pi
i , (11)
where P is a NM2 × N matrix with p (s′|s, a) as its elements. Combining (11)
and (10) leads to
Qpii = ri + γP (I − γGpi)
−1
Bpiri (12)
=
(
I + γP (I − γGpi)
−1Bpi
)
ri. (13)
In addition, (8) can be rewritten more compactly as
V pii = BpiQ
pi
i . (14)
Lastly, we define the total game value of a two-player stochastic game starting
at state s, under a bi-policy pi, V pi (s), as the sum of the value functions of both
players, i.e., V pi (s) = V pi1 (s) + V
pi
2 (s).
2.3 Nash Equilibrium
In non-cooperative game theory, the Nash equilibrium (NE) is one of the most
important solution concepts. A NE is an equilibrium where no player will benefit
from unilaterally deviating from their current strategy given the other players’
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Fig. 1: Chicken game. Cells show payoffs to the pair of players.
strategies remain unchanged [21,22]. In a two-player single-stage game (state s),
pi (s) is a NE if and only if,
Ri (s, pi (s)) ≥ Ri (s, ai, pi−i (s)) , ai ∈ Ai, (15)
The most important theorem regarding to the existence of NE, for any n-player
games, is as follows [22,25]:
Theorem 1. (Nash Existence [22,25]) Every finite game has at least one mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium.
However, there can exist multiple or even an infinite number of Nash equilibria,
and finding a NE or determining the number of them is a NP-hard problem [9].
Many algorithms, such as the Lemke-Howson Algorithm, have been developed
to address this problem. See, e.g., [2,9] for more details on algorithms for finding
NE. A concrete example of the chicken game [28] is shown in Figure 1. In this
game two cars are driving toward each other. Each driver may either chicken-out
by swerving away (action C) or dare by continuing straight (action D). where
there are three NEs, as follows:
1. pure strategy - (C,D), with game values R1 = 2, R2 = 7
2. pure strategy - (C,D), with game values R1 = 7, R2 = 2
3. mixed strategy - pi1 :
(
2
3C,
1
3D
)
, pi2 :
(
2
3C,
1
3D
)
, with game values R1 = R2 =
14
3
We can see that different NEs have different game values. This non-uniqueness
property causes the non-convergence issue and is a bottleneck for MRL research.
2.4 Correlated Equilibrium
The correlated equilibrium (CE) is a more general solution concept in non-
cooperative games. Unlike NE, in which all agents act independently on a selfish
and conservative basis, a CE allows dependencies among agents. A CE is a prob-
ability distribution over the joint space of actions, in which all agents optimize
their payoff with respect to one another’s probabilities, conditioned on their own
probabilities [12].
To illustrate, consider the chicken game shown in Figure 1. Assume there is
a trusted mediator devising a joint bi-strategy pi for Player # 1 and Player # 2
from among these choices:
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1. Player # 1 takes action C and Player # 2 takes action C;
2. Player # 1 takes action C and Player # 2 takes action D;
3. Player # 1 takes action D and Player # 2 takes action C;
4. Player # 1 takes action D and Player # 2 takes action D.
The mediator selects one of these four pure bi-strategies by sampling from a
distribution with probabilities piCC, piCD, piDC, piDD , respectively, where piCC +
piCD+piDC+piDD = 1. Once a pure bi-strategy is picked, the mediator will make
a recommendation to both players accordingly. However, both players receive
the recommendation regarding their own actions without knowing what recom-
mendation the other player receives. Each player has the option to accept the
recommendation or not.
A CE is such an equilibrium that each player will accept the recommendation
with the belief that the other player will also accept the recommendation. In
other words, in the case that the other player takes the recommended action,
one will not benefit from deviating from the mediator’s recommendation.
In the Chicken Game example, the mediator’s distribution induces a CE if
and only if these inequalities hold:
6piCC + 2piCD ≥ 7piCC + 0piCD
6piCC + 2piDC ≥ 7piCC + 0piDC
7piDC + 0piDD > 6piDC + 2piDD,
6piCC + 2piDC > 7piCC + 0piDC,
7piCD + 0piDD > 6piCD + 2piDD
(16)
Armed with some intuition of CE given by the preceding example, we now
formally define CE as follows [26]:
Definition 1. Let ∆ (A) denote the set of probability distributions over A, and
X be a random variable taking values in A =
∏
i∈I Ai distributed according to
pi ∈ ∆ (A). Then pi is a correlated equilibrium if and only if
Σa−i∈A−iP (X = a|Xi = ai) [Ri (s, ai, a−i)−Ri (s, aˇi, a−i)] ≥ 0,
for all ai ∈ Ai such that P (Xi = ai) > 0 and all aˇi ∈ Ai \ ai.
One real application of CE is the traffic light control shown in Figure 2. A
traffic light sends a private message with an action recommendation to each car
(“stop” for A and C and “go” for B and D). Each car can decide whether to
accept it or not. Rationally, no car will reject the recommendation from the
traffic lights given that all other cars obey the rules.
Similar to NE, an important theorem regarding the existence of CE is as
follows [14]:
Theorem 2. (Correlated Equilibrium Existence [14]) Every finite game has at
least one Correlated equilibrium.
In fact, CE is a superset of NE [4], and hence for any general sum game, the
number of CEs is larger than or equal to the number of NEs. In contrast to NE,
for which no efficient method of computation is known, finding CEs can be done
in polynomial time via linear programming.
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Fig. 2: Traffic light control
2.5 Cooperative Strategy
Both NE and CE are equilibria of competitive games. In a cooperative game, by
contrast, an agreement on a joint strategy for all players can be called a cooper-
ative strategy (CS). A characteristic function v defines the type of cooperation
between players [10], and for a two-player single-stage game (state s), can be
defined as
v (s, a) = Val (R1 (s, a) , R2 (s, a)) , a ∈ A = A1 ×A2. (17)
Val (·) is self-defined, based on the type of cooperation.
3 Conventional MIRL Approaches
Before introducing our algorithms, we review several existing approaches to
MIRL and related problems. The first of these is a decentralized MIRL (d-MIRL)
algorithm developed by Reddy et al. [29]. This algorithm is decentralized in the
sense that it infers agents’ rewards one by one, rather than all at once. All agents
are assumed to follow a Nash equilibrium at every single game. The key idea
is to find a reward that maximize the difference between the Q value of the
observed policy and those of pure strategies, which is analogous to the classical
approach to single-agent IRL given in [24]. Though in the original version of
their algorithm reward is assumed dependent only on the state, we can extend
it to treat action dependency as well. Using our notation and player 1 as an
example, the d-MIRL approach to a two-person general-sum MIRL problem is
X Xiaomin Lin, Stephen C. Adams and Peter A. Beling
to solve the following linear program:
maximize:
N∑
s=1
min a1
(
Bpi −Bpi|a1
)
Dpir1 − λ ‖r1‖1
subject to:
(
Bpi|a1 −Bpi
)
Dpir1 ≤ 0,
where Dpi is defined in (25) in the following section, λ is an adjustable penalty
coefficient for having too many non-zero values in the reward vector.
The key idea of the second approach is to model a two-person general-sum
MIRL as an IRL problem. This approach requires us to select one player (e.g.
player 1) and treat the other player as part of the passive environment. We extend
the Bayesian IRL (BIRL) approach developed in [27], which is only applicable to
state-dependent reward recovery, to involve action-dependence cases. Note that
the reward to be recovered is R1 (s, a1) instead of R1 (s, a1, a2), as player 2 is not
considered adaptive. That is to say, R1 (s, a1, a2) = R1 (s, a1) for all a2 ∈ A2.
Using our notation, the algorithm to recover player 1’s reward is:
minimize:
1
2
(r1 − µr1)
T
Σ−1r1 (r1 − µr1)
subject to:
(
Fpi1a1 − Ca1
)
r1 > 0,
(18)
for all a1 ∈ A1, where
Fpi1a1 =
[
γ
(
Gpi −Gpi1|a1
)
(I − γGpi)
−1 + I
]
Cpi1 ,
and Cpi1 is a N ×NM sparse matrix constructed from pi1, whose ith row is,
0, · · · , pi1 (i, 1) , · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
N
, · · ·︸︷︷︸
(M−2)N
, 0, · · · , pi1 (i,M) , · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
N

 ,
and Ca1 is conceptually similar to Cpi1 , except for being constructed from a pure
strategy a1 for all states.
Strictly speaking, the BIRL approach is not a dedicated algorithm for MIRL
problems but rather a way of shoehorning the multi-agent problem into a single-
agent, IRL setting. BIRL will provide a useful point of comparison to quantify
the benefits of explicitly modeling the decisions of all players.
The third approach is not applicable to a general MIRL problem but a re-
stricted family: zero-sum games. The algorithm to recover one player’s reward
vector (assuming the other player’s reward is the additive inverse) is
minimize:
1
2
(r − µr)
T
Σ−1r (r − µr)
subject to:
(
Bpi|a1 −Bpi
)
Dpir ≤ 0(
Bpi|a2 −Bpi
)
Dpir ≥ 0,
(19)
for all a1 ∈ A1 and a2 ∈ A2. More details can be found in [17].
These three approaches will be revisited as benchmarks in later sections.
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length XI
4 MIRL Model Development
This section proposes five two-player general-sum MIRL problems and corre-
sponding approaches to them. We first informally define an MIRL problem.
Given a bipolicy pi being played in a two-player, general-sum game with states,
actions, dynamics, and discount {S,Ai, P, γ}, the MIRL problem is to find re-
wards r1, r2 that best explain the observed policy. Though we will not do so in
this paper, MIRL may defined in terms of an set of observed state-action values
O rather a bipolicy.
The MRL literature suggests that an agreement over a specific solution con-
cept may be needed to solve a MRL problem. Similarly, in our approaches to
MIRL, one basic assumption is required: both players agree on a specific strat-
egy/equilibrium to play and this information is available to us in posing the
MIRL problem. We limit attention to the following five solution concepts:
1. utilitarian Cooperative Strategy (uCS). In (17), consider Val (·) =∑
(·). A single-stage game in state s and taking action a is a utilitarian
cooperative strategy (uCS) if and only if∑
i
Ri (s, a) ≥
∑
i
Ri (s, a
′) , a′ ∈ A = A1 ×A2 \ a. (20)
2. Adversarial Equilibrium (advE) An advE is a type of NE. It has another
feature that no player is hurt by any change of others [15,19]. That is to say,
in a two-player single-stage game (state s), pi (s) is an advE if and only if,
in addition to (15),
Ri (s, pii (s) , pi−i (s)) ≤ Ri (s, pii (s) , a−i) , a−i ∈ A−i, (21)
3. Coordination Equilibrium (cooE). A cooE is also a type of NE. It has
another feature that all players’ maximum expected payoffs are achieved
[15,19]. Mathematically, in a two-player single-stage game (state s), pi (s) is
a cooE if and only if, in addition to (15),
Ri (s, pi (s)) ≥ Ri (s, a) , a ∈ A = A1 ×A2. (22)
4. utilitarian Correlated Equilibrium (uCE). We borrow the concept of
utilitarian correlated equilibrium (uCE) from [12] and state that in a two-
player single-stage game (state s), pi (s) is a uCE if and only if,
ΣiRi (s, pi (s)) ≥ ΣiRi (s, pˇi (s)) , pˇi (s) ∈ piCE \ pi (s) . (23)
5. utilitarian Correlated Equilibrium (uNE). Similar to uCE, in a two-
player single-stage game (state s), a NE pi (s) is a utilitarian Nash Equilib-
rium (uNE) if and only if
ΣiRi (s, pi (s)) ≥ ΣiRi (s, pˇi (s)) , pˇi (s) ∈ piNE \ pi (s) . (24)
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Among the above five equilibria, it is easy to show that uCS, uCE and uNE
always exist and unique in any games (uCS for cooperative while uCE and
uNE for noncooperative). Both advE and cooE are shown to be unique in a
noncooperative game, though neither of them is guaranteed to exist [15,19] in
any games.
The distinctions between cooE and uCS are worth noting. Intuitively, cooE is
a noncooperative game equilibrium, which means that agents are essentially self-
ish. They are forced to cooperate in order to maximize their individual benefits.
When following a uCS, by contrast, agents cooperate with each other actively
and may even sacrifice their own benefits to achieve a better overall outcome.
Section 5 will help illustrate the differences.
4.1 Extension to stochastic games
Filar and Vrieze [11] show how the Q function links a stochastic game to a single
stage game. Q functions at one particular state with different bi-strategy are
treated as payoffs for that particular single stage game (note the terms “game”
and “state” can be used interchangeably), and the stochastic game is said to be in
an equilibrium if and only if all single games (over all states) are in equilibrium.
We now extend our definitions of the five strategies/equilibria from a single game
to a two-player stochastic game, as follows,
Definition 2. A bi-policy pi is a uCS/advE/cooE/uNE/uCE of a two-player
stochastic game G if only if pi (s) is a uCS/advE/CooE/uNE/uCE of its sub-
game G (s), for all s ∈ S.
Correspondingly, we define that a uCS-MIRL/advE-MIRL/cooE-MIRL/uNE-
MIRL/uCE-MIRL problem is an MIRL problem in which the players are as-
sumed to employ a uCS/advE/CooE/uNE/uCE.
4.2 uCS-MIRL
A main result characterizing the set of solutions to a two-player uCS-MIRL
problem is the following:
Theorem 3. Given a two-player stochastic game {S,Ai, ri, P, γ}, an observed
bi-policy pi is a uCS if and only if
(Bpi −Ba)Dpi (r1 + r2) ≥ 0, a ∈ A = A1 ×A2 (25)
where Dpi = I + γP (I − γGpi)
−1
Bpi. Ba is obtained from such a bi-policy that
players employ the bi-strategy a in all states.
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length XIII
Proof. According to the definition of uCS, pi is a uCS if and only if, for any state
s and pure bi-strategy a ∈ A = A1 ×A2, we have
pi (s) ∈ argmax
a∈A
∑
i
Qpii (s, a)
⇔
∑
i
Qpii (s, pi (s)) ≥
∑
i
Qpii (s, a)
⇔r1 (s, pi (s)) + r2 (s, pi (s)) + γPs,pi(s) (V
pi
1 + V
pi
2 )
≥ r1 (s, a) + r2 (s, a) + γPs,a (V
pi
1 + V
pi
2 )
⇔Bpi (r1 + r2) + γBpiP (I − γGpi)
−1
Bpi (r1 + r2)
≥ Ba (r1 + r2) + γBaP (I − γGpi)
−1
Bpi (r1 + r2)
⇔ (Bpi −Ba)
(
I + γP (I − γGpi)
−1Bpi
)
(r1 + r2) ≥ 0
⇔ (Bpi −Ba)Dpi (r1 + r2) ≥ 0
(26)
⊓⊔
Since any solution that is consistent with (25) ensures a unique uCS, we can
borrow the idea introduced in [17] and propose a Bayesian approach. The general
idea is to maximize the posterior probability of the inferred rewards, p (r1, r2|pi),
which can be expressed as
p (r1, r2|pi) ∝ f (r1, r2) p (pi|r1, r2) , (27)
where p (pi|r1, r2) is the likelihood of observing pi given r1 and r2 and f (r1, r2)
is a joint prior of r1 and r2 that we need to specify. Recall the assumption that
f (r1, r2) = f (r1) f (r2) , (28)
which allows specification of the prior over r1 and r2 independently. We adopt
a Gaussian prior on both rewards; that is, ri ∼ N (µri , Σri), where µri is the
mean of ri and Σri is the covariance. Then the probability density function of
ri is
f (ri) =
1
(2pi)N/2 |Σri |
1/2
exp
(
−
1
2
(ri − µri)
T Σ−1ri (ri − µri)
)
, i = 1, 2. (29)
To model the likelihood function p(pi|r1, r2), assume that the bi-policy which
the two agents follow is a unique uCS given r1, r2. The likelihood is then a
probability mass function given by
p (pi|r1, r2) =
{
1, if pi is uCS for r1, r2
0, otherwise.
(30)
Thus, the optimization problem for uCS-MIRL can be formulated as
maximize: f (r1, r2)
subject to: p (pi|r1, r2) = 1.
(31)
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Equivalently,
minimize:
1
2
∑
i
(ri − µri)
T
Σ−1ri (ri − µri)
subject to:
(
Bpi −Bpi|a
)
Dpi (r1 + r2) ≥ 0, a ∈ A = A1 ×A2.
(32)
4.3 advE-MIRL
The main result characterizing the set of solutions to a two-player advE-MIRL
problem is the following:
Theorem 4. Given a two-player stochastic game {S,Ai, ri, P, γ}, the observed
bi-policy pi is an advE if and only if(
Bpi|a1 −Bpi
)
Dpir1 ≤ 0, ∀a1 ∈ A1(
Bpi|a2 −Bpi
)
Dpir2 ≤ 0, ∀a2 ∈ A2(
Bpi|a1 −Bpi
)
Dpir2 ≥ 0, ∀a1 ∈ A1(
Bpi|a2 −Bpi
)
Dpir1 ≥ 0, ∀a2 ∈ A2,
(33)
where Bpi|a1 is obtained from such a bi-policy that player 2 employs their original
policy while player 1 always chooses action a1 in any state (game).
Proof. Eqs (33) contains four inequalities. In this proof, we will first show that
the first and second inequalities constitute a necessary and sufficient condition
for pi being a NE. Recall that a bi-policy pi is a minimax equilibrium for a 2-
player zero-sum game if and only if [17] Recall that a bi-policy pi is a minimax
equilibrium for a two-player zero-sum game if and only if [17]
[Qpi (s)]
T
pi1 (s) ≥ V
pi (s) 1M
Qpi (s)pi2 (s) ≤ V
pi (s) 1M .
(34)
Similarly, pi is a NE if and only if
[Qpi2 (s)]
T pi1 (s) ≤ V
pi
2 (s) 1M
Qpi1 (s)pi2 (s) ≤ V
pi
1 (s) 1M .
(35)
Combining (14) and (35) leads to
Bpi|a2Q
pi
2 ≤ BpiQ
pi
2 , ∀a2 ∈ A2
Bpi|a1Q
pi
1 ≤ BpiQ
pi
1 , ∀a1 ∈ A1.
(36)
Substituting (12) into (36) and rearranging the two sides of the inequalities yields(
Bpi|a1 −Bpi
)
Dpir1 ≤ 0, ∀a1 ∈ A1(
Bpi|a2 −Bpi
)
Dpir2 ≤ 0, ∀a2 ∈ A2.
(37)
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length XV
We now turn to the additional feature of advE. Recall (21), it is easy to derive
that an advE for a two-player general-sum game if and only if, in addition to
(35)
[Qpi1 (s)]
T pi1 (s) ≥ V
pi
1 (s) 1M
Qpi2 (s)pi2 (s) ≥ V
pi
2 (s) 1M .
(38)
Following similar steps to those used to derive (36), the additional constraints
(38) can be reduced to (
Bpi|a1 −Bpi
)
Dpir2 ≥ 0, ∀a1 ∈ A1(
Bpi|a2 −Bpi
)
Dpir1 ≥ 0, ∀a2 ∈ A2.
(39)
⊓⊔
Since it has been proved that, in a one-stage game, if an advE exists it must
be unique [19], an advE for a stochastic game, must also be unique, if it exists.
Therefore, we can still use Bayesian approach to solve advE-MIRL problems.
The prior (29) is also valid here. But the likelihood would be
p (pi|r1, r2) =
{
1, if pi is an AdvE for r1, r2
0, otherwise.
(40)
And the optimization problem for advE-MIRL is
minimize:
1
2
∑
i
(ri − µri)
T
Σ−1ri (ri − µri)
subject to:
(
Bpi|a1 −Bpi
)
Dpir1 ≤ 0, ∀a1 ∈ A1(
Bpi|a2 −Bpi
)
Dpir2 ≤ 0, ∀a2 ∈ A2(
Bpi|a1 −Bpi
)
Dpir2 ≥ 0, ∀a1 ∈ A1(
Bpi|a2 −Bpi
)
Dpir1 ≥ 0, ∀a2 ∈ A2.
(41)
In fact, there is a direct link between the minimax equilibrium of a compet-
itive zero-sum game and an advE for a special zero-sum case, as the following
proposition,
Proposition 1. The minimax equilibrium of a single competitive zero-sum game
is an advE, and vice versa.
Proof. Let r1 = r = −r2. Then (33) reduces to(
Bpi|a1 −Bpi
)
Dpir ≤ 0, ∀a1 ∈ A1(
Bpi|a2 −Bpi
)
Dpir ≥ 0, ∀a2 ∈ A2,
(42)
which are exactly the constraints of (19), the necessary and sufficient conditions
for pi being a minimax equilibrium for a zero-sum game, in [17].
⊓⊔
From Proposition 1 we can see that advE is a more general concept for
general-sum games, whereas the minimax equilibrium is specific to zero-sum
games.
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4.4 cooE-MIRL
The main result characterizing the set of solutions to a two-player cooE-MIRL
problem is the following:
Theorem 5. Given a two-player stochastic game {S,Ai, ri, P, γ}, the observed
bi-policy pi is an CooE if and only if(
Bpi|a1 −Bpi
)
Dpir1 ≤ 0, ∀a1 ∈ A1(
Bpi|a2 −Bpi
)
Dpir2 ≤ 0, ∀a2 ∈ A2
(Bpi −Ba)Dpir1 ≥ 0, ∀a ∈ A = A1 ×A2
(Bpi −Ba)Dpir2 ≥ 0, ∀a ∈ A = A1 ×A2.
(43)
In (43), the first two inequalities, which guarantee pi is a NE, has been estab-
lished in Section 4.3. The latter two inequalities warrant the unique property of
cooE, the proof of which is sketched below.
Proof. According to the definition of cooE, pi is a cooE if and only if, for any
state s and pure bi-strategy a ∈ A = A1 ×A2,
pi (s) ∈ argmax
a∈A
Qpii (s, a)
⇔Qpii (s, pi (s)) ≥ Q
pi
i (s, a)
⇔ri (s, pi (s)) + γPs,pi(s)V
pi
i ≥ ri (s, a) + γPs,aV
pi
i
⇔Bpiri + γBpiP (I − γGpi)
−1
Bpiri
≥ Bari + γBaP (I − γGpi)
−1Bpiri
⇔ (Bpi −Ba)
(
I + γP (I − γGpi)
−1
Bpi
)
ri ≥ 0
⇔ (Bpi −Ba)Dpiri ≥ 0.
(44)
⊓⊔
We can also develop a similar optimization problem for cooE-MIRL. Using
the same reasoning as in the case of advE, it is easy to show that a cooE for a
stochastic game is unique, if it exists. As a result, the Bayesian approach is also
valid here, with the same prior (29) but a different likelihood as follows
p (pi|r1, r2) =
{
1, if pi is an cooE for r1, r2
0, otherwise.
(45)
Hence the optimization problem for cooE-MIRL is
minimize:
1
2
∑
i
(ri − µri)
T
Σ−1ri (ri − µri)
subject to:
(
Bpi|a1 −Bpi
)
Dpir1 ≤ 0, ∀a1 ∈ A1(
Bpi|a2 −Bpi
)
Dpir2 ≤ 0, ∀a2 ∈ A2
(Bpi −Ba)Dpir1 ≥ 0, ∀a ∈ A = A1 ×A2
(Bpi −Ba)Dpir2 ≥ 0, ∀a ∈ A = A1 ×A2.
(46)
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4.5 uCE-MIRL
The result that characterizes the set of solutions to a two-player CE-MIRL prob-
lem is as follows:
Theorem 6. Given a two-player stochastic game {S,Ai, ri, P, γ}, the observed
bi-policy pi is a CE if and only if
piTH (s, ai)
T
[H (s, ai)−H (s, aˇi)]Dpiri ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, ∀ai ∈ Ai, aˇi ∈ Ai \ ai,
(47)
where pi is restructured from pi to be a column vector of length NM2, and H(s, ai)
is a linear transformation operator as described in the proof below.
Proof. By definition of CE, for a two-player general-sum stochastic game G, a
bi-policy pi is a CE if and only if∑
a2
pi (a1, a2|s)Q
pi
1 (s, a1, a2) ≥
∑
a2
pi (a1, a2|s)Q
pi
1 (s, aˇ1, a2) , ∀a1 ∈ A1, aˇ1 ∈ A1 \ a1∑
a1
pi (a1, a2|s)Q
pi
2 (s, a1, a2) ≥
∑
a1
pi (a1, a2|s)Q
pi
2 (s, a1, aˇ2) , ∀a2 ∈ A2, aˇ2 ∈ A2 \ a2,
(48)
for all s ∈ S. Rearranging (48) yields
pi (a1, : |s)
(
[Qpi1 (s, a1, :)]
T − [Qpi1 (s, aˇ1, :)]
T
)
≥ 0
[pi (:, a2|s)]
T
(Qpi2 (s, :, a2)−Q
pi
2 (s, :, aˇ2)) ≥ 0,
(49)
where pi (a1, : |s) is a row vectors of 1 × M , spanning over all a2 ∈ A2, and
pi (:, a2|s) is a column vectors of M × 1, spanning over all a1 ∈ A1. Recall
Qpii (s, a) = Ri (s, a) + γ
∑
s′
p (s′|s, a)V pii (s
′) . (50)
So
[Qpi1 (s, a1, :)]
T
= [R1 (s, a1, :)]
T
+ γp (: |s, a1, :)V
pi
1
Qpi2 (s, :, a2) = R2 (s, :, a2) + γp (: |s, :, a2)V
pi
2 .
(51)
Substituting (51) into (49) leads to
pi (a1, : |s)
{
[R1 (s, a1, :)]
T − [r1 (s, aˇ1, :)]
T
+ γ [p (: |s, a1, :)− p (: |s, aˇ1, :)]V
pi
1
}
≥ 0
[pi (:, a2|s)]
T {R2 (s, :, a2)− r2 (s, :, aˇ2) + γ [p (: |s, :, a2)− p (: |s, :, aˇ2)]V
pi
2 } ≥ 0.
(52)
The above inequality can be further simplified. First, let [R1 (s, a1, :)]
T
=
H (s, a1) r1 and R2 (s, :, a2) = H (s, a2) r2, where H(s, ai) is a sparseM ×NM
2
matrix. It is also easy to see p (: |s, a1, :) = H (s, a1)P and p (: |s, :, a2) =
H (s, a2)P . In addition, we can also have pi (a1, : |s) = [H (s, a1)pi]
T
= piTH (s, a1)
T
,
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and pi (:, a2|s) = H (s, a2)pi. Substituting (10) into (52) and rearranging it, we
can get
piTH (s, ai)
T
[H (s, ai)−H (s, aˇi)]
(
I + γP (I − γGpi)
−1
Bpi
)
ri ≥ 0, i = 1, 2,
(53)
Recall
Dpi = I + γP (I − γGpi)
−1Bpi, (54)
we can express (53) compactly as
piTH (s, ai)
T
[H (s, ai)−H (s, aˇi)]Dpiri ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, ∀ai ∈ Ai, aˇi ∈ Ai \ ai,
(55)
⊓⊔
Clearly, any sensible point that is consistent with (55) constitutes a CE for
the stochastic game. Many points in the convex hull of CE, however, are less
meaningful because only the uCE is of interest. Hence, we desire to find some
way to choose between solutions satisfying (55). A first idea is to maximize∑
s V
pi (s). That is not enough though, because reaching a uCE is difficult in
practice. Finding a uCS is a much easier problem, by contrast. This fact gives rise
to another idea. Before going into details, we introduce four concepts: cooperation
gap, local uCS, local improvement and local reduced gap.
Definition 3. The cooperation gap Ipicg (s), corresponding to a starting state s
and a bi-policy pi in a two-player general-sum stochastic game, is the total game
value difference between pi and pi∗, where pi∗ is any uCS; specifically,
Ipicg (s) = V
pi∗ (s)− V pi (s) , s ∈ S.
Definition 4. The local uCS, corresponding to a starting state s and a bi-policy
pi in a two-player general-sum stochastic game, is a bi-policy for which the two
players employ a uCS bi-policy pi∗ at s and then employ pi afterwards.
Definition 5. The local improvement Ipiimp (s), corresponding to a starting state
s and a bi-policy pi in a two-player general-sum stochastic game, is the total
game value gain by employing the local uCS.
Definition 6. The local reduced gap Ipirg (s), corresponding to a starting state s
and a bi-policy pi in a two-player general-sum stochastic game, is the total game
value difference between a uCS and a local uCS; specifically,
Ipirg (s) = V
pi∗ (s)−Qpi (s, pi∗ (s)) , s ∈ S,
and the total local improvement for pi is
Ipirg =
∑
s
Ipirg (s) =
∑
s
V pi
∗
(s)−Qpi (s, pi∗ (s)) , s ∈ S. (56)
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An implication from the above definitions is that for a starting state s,
Ipirg (s) = I
pi
cg (s)− I
pi
imp (s), shown in Figure 3.
It is obvious that for a two-player general sum stochastic game, among all
its CEs, the uCE is closest to its uCS in terms of the total game value, as
illustrated in Figure 3. In a uCE-MIRL problem, however, all CEs except uCE
are unobservable. Therefore, we need to find a way to infer a set of rewards
{r1, r2} such that the observed pi is most likely the uCE of the game.
Fig. 3: The game value distance relationship between uCE, uCS and other CEs
By definition, a local uCS improves V pi (s) by employing a uCS strategy only
at current state s, resulting in a local improvement with respect to pi and a local
reduced gap with respect to a uCS. Adding up all those local reduced gaps over
all states gives a measure of how close a bi-policy pi is to a uCS, in terms of
the total game value. We now propose an important theorem that captures the
relationship between the local reduced gap and uCE, as follows:
Theorem 7. Consider a two-person general-sum stochastic game Γ with a col-
lection of CEs, ΠCE and a bi-policy pi
∗ that is a uCS. Then pi∗CE ∈ ΠCE is a
uCE if and only if its total local reduced gap I
pi∗CE
rg is no greater than that of any
other CE, specifically,
I
pi∗CE
rg ≤ I
piCE
rg , ∀piCE ∈ ΠCE. (57)
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Proof. We first show necessity. From (56) and the properties of value function,
we have
I
pi∗
CE
rg − I
piCE
rg
=
[∑
s
V pi
∗
(s)−Qpi
∗
CE (s, pi∗ (s))
]
−
[∑
s
V pi
∗
(s)−QpiCE (s, pi∗ (s))
]
=
∑
s
QpiCE (s, pi∗ (s))−Qpi
∗
CE (s, pi∗ (s))
=
∑
s
{[
r˜1 (s, pi
∗ (s)) + r˜2 (s, pi
∗ (s)) + γPs,pi∗(s)V
piCE
]
−
[
r˜1 (s, pi
∗ (s)) + r˜2 (s, pi
∗ (s)) + γPs,pi∗(s)V
pi∗
CE
]}
=γ
∑
s
Ps,pi∗(s)
(
V piCE − V pi
∗
CE
)
.
(58)
Since the definition of pi∗CE implies that V
piCE (s) ≤ V pi
∗
CE (s) for all s, the column
vector V piCE − V pi
∗
CE is non-positive. Also, Ps,pi∗(s) is a non-negative row vector
as all its entries are probabilities. Therefore, Ps,pi∗(s)
(
V piCE − V pi
∗
CE
)
≤ 0 for all
s ∈ S, and consequently, I
pi∗
CE
rg ≤ IpiCErg .
Next, we show sufficiency by assuming I
pi∗
CE
rg ≤ IpiCErg , for all piCE ∈ piCE and
that pi∗CE is not a uCE. Since pi
∗
CE is not a uCE, there must exist a uCE, piuCE,
such that V piuCE (s) > V pi
∗
CE (s), for all s ∈ S. Then from (58) we can conclude
I
pi∗
CE
rg − I
piuCE
rg = γ
∑
s
Ps,pi∗(s)
(
V piuCE − V pi
∗
CE
)
> 0,
which contradicts our assumption that Ipi
∗
CE ≤ IpiCE , for all piCE ∈ ΠCE.
The intuition behind Theorem 7 is: comparing to any other CE, a uCE is
“closer” to the uCS. Its corresponding local uCS is even closer to uCS and as
a result, there is less room to further shrink the local reduced gap. Hence the
smaller the local reduced gap is, the more likely a CE pi is a uCE. Thus, given
a CE pi, a desired pair of r1 and r2 satisfies
minimize:
∑
s
y (s)− V pi (s)
subject to: Qpi1 (s, a) +Q
pi
2 (s, a) ≤ y (s)
V pi (s) ≤ y (s) ,
(59)
for all a ∈ A = A1 ×A2.
However, r1 = r2 = 0 is the optimal solution to (59). The reason is that
V pi (s) needs to be enlarged so that picking a uCE is achievable with higher
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probability. Putting all the above together, we propose the following linear pro-
gramming problem to find the desired r1 and r2,
maximize:
∑
s
V pi (s)− λ (y (s)− V pi (s))
subject to: Qpi1 (s, a) +Q
pi
2 (s, a) ≤ y (s)
V pi (s) ≤ y (s)
Constraint (55),
(60)
where λ is a regularization parameter. Expressing V pii and Q
pi
i (s, a) as functions
of ri and reformulating those inequalities more compactly in matrix notation
leads to
maximize: 11×N ×
[
(1 + λ) (I − γGpi)
−1
Bpi (r1 + r2)− λy
]
+ regularization terms
subject to: piTH (s, ai)
T [H (s, ai)−H (s, aˇi)]Dpiri ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, ∀ai ∈ Ai, aˇi ∈ Ai \ ai
Dpi (r1 + r2) ≤ y · 1M×M
(I − γGpi)
−1
Bpi (r1 + r2) ≤ y.
(61)
We now discuss the regularization terms in (61). One challenging issue for
MIRL is that there often exists many solutions that are equally sensible so that
it is more likely than IRL to recover rewards which are far from actual ones.
For example, in [17] the authors emphasize the importance of the structure of
rewards. Therefore, some prior knowledge or assumption of the game, as well as
the structure of the unknown rewards, is very helpful. For example, it is often
assumed that, all other things being equal, an unknown reward vector is sparse
[24]. One easy way to incorporate this assumption is to add a penalty term to
the objective function to regularize non-sparsity. There might be other problem-
specific knowledge/assumption available and taking advantage of it will help
infer higher-quality rewards.
4.6 uNE-MIRL
Recall that the necessary and sufficient condition for an observed bi-policy pi
being a NE for a two-player general-sum stochastic game is given by
(
Bpi|a1 −Bpi
)
Dpir1 ≤ 0, ∀a1 ∈ A1(
Bpi|a2 −Bpi
)
Dpir2 ≤ 0, ∀a2 ∈ A2.
(62)
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Since NE is a subset of CE, we can borrow the idea proposed in Section 4.5 and
solve a uNE-MIRL problem by solving the following LP problem
maximize: 11×N ×
[
(1 + λ) (I − γGpi)
−1Bpi (r1 + r2)− λy
]
+ other problem-specific regularized terms
subject to:
(
Bpi|a1 −Bpi
)
Dpir1 ≤ 0, ∀a1 ∈ A1(
Bpi|a2 −Bpi
)
Dpir2 ≤ 0, ∀a2 ∈ A2
Dpi (r1 + r2) ≤ y · 1M×M
(I − γGpi)
−1Bpi (r1 + r2) ≤ y.
(63)
5 Numerical Examples I: GridWorld
This section describes the behaviour of our algorithms (except advE-MIRL)
using two grid games (GGs), shown in Figure 4, namely GG1 for the left and
GG2 for the right. These games have been used extensively in many theory-
oriented MRL works [15,19,12]. In both GGs, there are two agents, A and B,
and two goals (or homes). The two agents act simultaneously and can move
only one step in any of the four compass directions. When adjacent to a wall,
choosing a direction into a wall results in a no-op, where the agent remains in the
current position. If both agents attempt to move into the same cell, a collision
occurs and they are pushed back to their original positions immediately, except
for cells in the bottom row. Each agent is rewarded upon reaching its goal.
However, since the reward is discounted with time, the earlier to reach the goal,
the better. GG1 and GG2 are similar in basic game rules but different in board
setup in two aspects. First, in GG1, the two players’ goals are separate while
their goals coincide in GG2. Second, in GG2, there are two barriers and if any
agent attempts to move downward through the barrier from the top, then with
1/2 probability this move fails and results in a no-op.
Fig. 4: Grid games. The circle indicates A’s goal and the hexagon indicates B’s
goal.
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We let agents A and B play the go-back-home games together according to
either uCS, uCE, uNE or cooE. Our task is to recover their rewards given the
equilibrium, the bi-policy, and the state transition dynamics. The basic reward-
ing rule is: either player receives reward 1 (discounted with time) once reaching
home and the game stops immediately, and 0 otherwise. When employing cooE,
however, neither player receives reward unless they reach home simultaneously.
Our experiments are conducted as follows. First, we apply the cooE-MRL
algorithm by Hu and Wellman [16], and the uCE-MRL algorithm proposed by
Green and Hall [12] to obtain cooE and uCE bi-policies, respectively. Then we
develop similar Q-learning based iterative algorithms for uCS-MRL and uNE-
MRL. The general procedure, namely multi-Q-learning algorithm, is the same
for all these four MRL algorithms and described in Algorithm 1. It is worth
emphasizing that the multi-Q-learning algorithm can be applied to many variants
of Q-learning problems as long as the equilibria exists and is unique [15,19,12].
It is easy to show that uCS, uCE, uNE and cooE all meet this requirement.
The second step is to apply our uCS-MIRL, cooE-MIRL uCE-MIRL and
uNE-MIRL algorithms accordingly, incorporating basic knowledge and some rea-
sonable assumptions into Gaussian priors for uCS and cooE. For example, one
assumption is that both players’ reward vectors are sparse, only depending on
reaching home or not. In addition, one agent’s position might have a small effect
on the other agent’s reward, or possibly no affect.
For each experiment, we compare recovered rewards of both players rrecA
and rrecB , with the true values rA and rB numerically. We use a normalized
root mean squared error (NRMSE) metric, where we first normalize a recovered
reward vector rrec on [0, 1], as follows:
rnrec =
rrec −min(rrec)
max(rrec)−min(rrec)
,
and then compute
NRMSE =
1
2

√‖rnrecA − rA‖2
dim(rA)
+
√
‖rnrecB − rB‖2
dim(rB)


We compare our MIRL algorithm with IRL and d-MIRL algorithms. First,
we use IRL algorithms to solve the uCS-, cooE-, uCE- and uNE-MIRL problems.
Specifically, we focus on B, and try to infer its reward. Obviously, the inferred
IRL reward is a function of the state and B’s own action. The IRL algorithm we
use is BIRL, proposed in [27]. Note that the reward vector recovered from IRL
can be extended to a MIRL reward vector by letting R (s, a1, a2) = R (s, a2) for
all a1 ∈ A1. Second, we use the d-MIRL algorithm to solve the above four prob-
lems. Recall that d-MIRL simply assumes agents employing a Nash equilibrium.
To further evaluate the quality of uCS-MIRL reward, let agents B1, B2 and
B3 learn uCS-MIRL, IRL and d-MIRL rewards, respectively, and figure out their
own policies piB1 , piB2 and piB3 . Then let these three agents play with A by using
their policies while A still employs piA as if it plays with B. We compute their
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Algorithm 1 General Multi-Q-learning algorithm
Require: f : uCS, cooE, uCE or uNE; α: learning rate
1: procedure Multi-Q(f, T, r1, r2, α)
2: Initialize: s, a,Q1, Q2, t = 0
3: while t < T do
4: agents choose bi-strategy a in state s
5: observe rewards and next state s′
6:
7: for i = 1→ N do
8: Vi (s
′) = fi (Q1 (s
′) , Q2 (s
′))
9: Qi (s, a) = (1− α)Qi (s, a) + α [(1− γ) ri (s, a) + γVi (s
′)]
10:
11: agents choose bi-strategy a′
12: s = s′, a = a′
13: decay α
14: t = t+ 1
total game value over all states and compare with true total game values, which
are the maximum. Obviously, for any reward, the larger the total game value
that can be achieved, the better quality it has.
Numerical results are summarized in Table 1 and Table 2. Table 2 summa-
rizes how close the total game value is to the true total game value, using recov-
ered reward from for each method, by computing 1N
∑N
s=1 (Vtrue (s)− Vrecovered (s))
2
,
where N is the number of states, Vtrue and Vrecovered are true total game value
vector and the one using recovered reward, respectively.
We can easily conclude that our MIRL algorithms generate satisfactory re-
sults and performs much better than IRL and d-MIRL algorithms for all the
four problems.
Grid Game #1 Grid Game #2
uCS-MIRL 1.50× 10−3 2.27 × 10−4
IRL 0.122 0.121
dMIRL 0.104 0.106
cooE-MIRL 0.026 0.026
IRL 0.409 0.319
dMIRL 0.085 0.083
uCE-MIRL 1.30× 10−3 1.39 × 10−10
IRL 0.287 0.311
dMIRL 0.089 0.083
uNE-MIRL 0 0
IRL 0.271 0.283
dMIRL 0.104 0.103
Table 1: NRMSE results for reward values comparison
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length XXV
Grid Game #1 Grid Game #2
uCS-MIRL 0.099 2.50 × 10−4
IRL 0.223 0.179
dMIRL 0.197 0.202
Table 2: total game value comparison for uCS
6 Numerical Examples II: Abstract Soccer Game
This section presents a demonstration of the advE-MIRL algorithm on a stylized
soccer game. Two-player soccer games of many forms are popular among MRL
researchers for algorithm demonstration and comparison purposes [18,12,17]. In
[17], a zero-sum MIRL algorithm is proposed and performance demonstrated on
a game that is similar to that used here. The algorithm in [17], however, requires
that the game be zero-sum. In this section, we relax the zero-sum assumption
and require only that the two players be foes, which enables us to rely on a
weaker assumption that they employ an advE.
The soccer game (see Figure 5) is depicted as follows. Players A and B com-
pete with each other, aiming to score by either bringing or kicking the ball
(represented by a circle) into their opponents’ goals (A’s goal are 6 and 11, and
B’s goal are 10 and 15). Both players can move simultaneously either in four
compass directions, ending in a neighbouring cell or stay unmoved. A ball ex-
change may occur with some probability in case of a collision in the same cell. A
kick action is also available to players. Each one has a perception of how likely
she is to making a scoring shot, or the probability of a successful shot (PSS),
if kicking the ball at a given position. For simplicity, PSS is assumed to be in-
dependent of the opponent’s position. The position based PSS distribution is
shown in Table 3.
PSS = 0.7 PSS = 0.5 PSS = 0.3 PSS = 0.1 PSS = 0
A 1, 7, 12, 16 2, 8, 13, 17 3, 9, 14, 18 4, 10, 15, 19 5, 20
PSS = 0.7 PSS = 0.5 PSS = 0.3 PSS = 0.1 PSS = 0
B 5, 9, 14, 20 4, 8, 13, 19 3, 7, 12, 18 2, 6, 11, 17 1, 16
Table 3: Original PSS distribution of each player
Note that a player’s PSS at a particular spot is her perceived likelihood
of a scoring short, rather than the actual probability of a successful shot. So
statistically calculating the successful shot rate from observation data would
not help reflect the player’s own beliefs about her shooting skills, which is the
reward.
The two players play against each other, employing a minimax equilibrium
in a zero-sum game. But this information is not available to us when solving the
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Fig. 5: Soccer game: initial board
MIRL problem. Instead, we are given: (1) the bi-policy of the two players over all
states, and; (2) the state transition dynamics (including the ball exchange rate
β = 0.6). In fact, this information can be statistically calculated or estimated
with sufficient observations. We simply skip this data pre-processing stage as it
is not the emphasis of this paper. We then assume that the two players follow
an advE and try to infer their rewards on this basis.
6.1 Prior Specification
As indicated in Section 4.3, one of the key specifications of the advE-MIRL
model is the prior, which encodes our beliefs of the unknown rewards. We use
two Gaussian priors for the unknowns of A and B with three types of means and
two types of covariance matrices, as follows:
– Weak Mean: for A, assign 0.5 point in every state where A has possession of
the ball and −0.5 point in every state where A loses possession of the ball.
Same setting for B.
– Median Mean: for A, assign 1 point whenever it has the ball and is in one of
the corner squares 1, 6, 11 and 16, and −1 point to A whenever B has the
ball and is in its hypothesized goal area 5, 10, 15 and 20. When A has the
ball and takes a shot, it is assigned 0.5 wherever it is; when B has the ball
and takes a shot, A is assigned -0.5 wherever B is. Otherwise, no points will
be assigned. Same setting for B.
– Strong Mean: More accurate than Median Mean, in the sense that the hy-
pothesized goal squares for A are 6 and 11, and 10 and 15 for B.
– Weak Covariance Matrix : an identity matrix for both A and B, which implies
no knowledge or guess about the relationship between any two reward values
is available.
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– Strong Covariance Matrix : a more complex covariance matrix constructed
from our following hypothesis of the reward structure, same for both A and
B.
1. when one player has the ball and takes a shot, its PSS depends only on
its’ current position in the field. That means that, take player A as an
example, ρ (rA (s1, aA = shoot, aB) , rA (s2, aA = shoot, aB)) = 1, where
in s1 and s2, A’s positions are identical;
2. at any state, one’s reward for any non-shoot action is one’s own position
dependent. Take player A as an example, for any two states s1 and s2 we
assume ρ (rA (s1, aA 6= shoot, aB) , rA (s2, aA 6= shoot, aB)) = 1, as long
as A’s positions are identical in these two states.
In addition, for simplicity, the standard deviation of any reward point is
assumed 1, so that the covariance matrix is identical to the correlation co-
efficient matrix.
To make it clear, our prior specifications do not imply a zero-sum relationship
between A and B’s reward. As a singularity issue may occur when using strong
covariance matrices, we add a small numerical perturbation to the diagonal.
6.2 Monte Carlo Simulation using Recovered Rewards
By solving an advE-MIRL problem (41), we recover A and B’s reward vectors,
over all states and all actions. There are 6 advE-MIRL reward vectors recovered
corresponding to the 6 pairs of means and covariance matrices. Since we have
seen that evaluating the quality of recovered reward by simply measuring its
numerical difference from true value may lead to misleading conclusion, we adopt
a Monte Carlo simulation approach to evaluation, as follows:
1. Create agents:
– C, which uses advE-MIRL reward;
– D, which uses true reward;
– E, which uses zero-sum MIRL reward;
– F, which uses dMIRL reward;
– G, which uses BIRL reward.
2. Simulate competitive games:
– C against D;
– C against E;
– C against F;
– C against G:
Note that agent E, F and G use rewards recovered from three conventional MIRL
approaches covered in Section 3. Here we let C plays the role of A and others
take the place of B (due to symmetry, two parties can switch roles as well). All
those games are simulated in three different environmental settings, where the
the ball exchange rates β are 0, 0.4 and 1. 5000 round games are simulated per
case.
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The simulation results are presented in Tables 4–7, where WM, MM, SM,
WC and SC stand for weak mean, median mean, strong mean, weak covariance
matrix and strong covariance matrix, respectively. To interpret the result, take
the 2nd row of Table 5 as an example: C uses WM and SC as prior and recovers
A’s advE-MIRL reward, while E also use the same prior and learns a zero-
sum MIRL reward vector of B. They come up with their own minimax policies
according to their learned rewards and environmental settings and play against
each other. 32.28/36.40 means C beats E with probability 32.28%, loses with
probability 36.40%, and end in a tie with probability 31.32%, when the ball
exchange rate is 1. Note that 0/0 shown in these tables means the both parties
learn very bad rewards such that no one is able to score a single point even if its
opponent is also poorly skilled.
advE-MIRL Rewards W/L% (β = 0.4) W/L% (β = 1) W/L% (β = 0)
WM & WC 0/32.44 0/58.00 0/49.98
WM & SC 20.40/25.46 20.50/38.24 42.88/50.16
MM & WC 4.60/30.12 9.36/44.00 10.44/49.88
MM & SC 24.86/24.94 25.10/24.80 49.97/50.02
SM & WC 14.90/30.52 6.80/42.50 15.42/50.08
SM & SC 25.26/24.80 25.00/24.80 50.14/49.86
Table 4: C vs D
advE-MIRL Rewards W/L% (β = 0.4) W/L% (β = 1) W/L% (β = 0)
WM & WC 0/2.40 0/0 0/0
WM & SC 22.76/28.94 32.28/36.40 43.14/50.14
MM & WC 0/0 9.20/5.60 4.12/16.86
MM & SC 24.86/25.12 25.04/24.96 49.54/50.44
SM & WC 11.24/10.60 8.80/9.18 16.10/24.46
SM & SC 25.28/25.06 24.94/25.12 50.13/49.86
Table 5: C vs E
The results in Tables 4–7 support the following conclusions:
1. The advE-MIRL algorithm performs, if not better, comparatively with zero-
sum MIRL algorithm, though the latter requires a stronger assumption.
2. The advE-MIRL algorithm performs notably better than d-MIRL and BIRL
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length XXIX
advE-MIRL Rewards W/L% (β = 0.4) W/L% (β = 1) W/L% (β = 0)
WM & WC 0/0 0/0 0/0
WM & SC 27.10/0 25.42/0 50.04/0
MM & WC 6.04/0 8.64/0 18.02/0
MM & SC 25.28/0 26.06/0 49.86/0
SM & WC 13.98/0 9.00/0 49.26/0
SM & SC 24.90/0 26.08/0 49.90/0
Table 6: C vs F
advE-MIRL Rewards W/L% (β = 0.4) W/L% (β = 1) W/L% (β = 0)
WM & WC 0/0 0/0 0/0
WM & SC 25.10/0 24.84/0 50.12/0
MM & WC 5.52/0 8.76/0 16.20/0
MM & SC 28.50/10.12 25.12/12.00 49.26/20.46
SM & WC 14.20/0 8.64/0 44.25/0
SM & SC 25.80/0 25.28/0 50.12/0
Table 7: C vs G
7 Conclusions and Future Work
We present novel and computationally tractable algorithms for five special vari-
ants of MIRL problems, as well as demonstrations on several benchmark grid-
world examples. The advE-MIRL problem formulation requires weaker assump-
tions but performs comparably with zero-sum MIRL. However, advE-MIRL out-
performs both d-MIRL and BIRL. Both uCS and cooE generate good results if
the estimated reward can be scaled correctly. The uCE and uNE problem for-
mulations perform remarkably well in two benchmark grid-world examples by
accurately estimating the value of the true reward. There are three reasons why
the results are so good. First, these two small GGs are well-defined in the sense
that there is no chance of moving in another direction by accident once a certain
direction is selected (no noise in action). Second, the bi-policy pi we use is exactly
the equilibrium of interest because it is generated from a corresponding MRL-Q-
learning algorithm. Third, we have incorporated strong prior information about
the game, and a good solution can be achieved by tuning the regularized coeffi-
cients.
Although this paper is restricted to the two-person case, an extension of the
methods to n-player cases would be straighforward because the equilibria we
study are unique in n-player games, if they exist. In this sense, advE-MIRL has
advantages over zero-sum MIRL as how to extend zero-sum MIRL from two-
player to n-player is not yet clear. However, our work is limited in two aspects:
(1) we only consider the case where both state and action spaces are discrete
and limited, and (2) though it is not explicitly emphasized, we use a strong
assumption that a full bi-policy over all states is available. In practice, it might
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not be possible to observe the game long enough to obtain an accurate estimate
of the true bi-policy over all states. Two potential directions for future work are
worth pursuing. One is to derive continuous versions of the proposed algorithms,
and the other is to treat the condition when only a partial bi-policy is available.
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